VIP Security

VIP SECURITY
October 17, 2008


Events:
For an event such as the funeral of a Vice President the U.S. Secret Service (a unit of the Department of the Treasury) would be responsible for the safety of the President, the Vice-President, their families, the President-elect and Vice President-elect and their families, major Presidential candidates and their families, and former Presidents and their families. The Secret Service also protects visiting heads of foreign states or governments and other foreign visitors to the United States when designated to do so by the President. It is possible that Maelev, as the President of Russia, would have Secret Service protection in addition to his own protection.

Permanent protectees, such as the president and first lady, have details of special agents permanently assigned to them. Temporary protectees, such as Maelev, are staffed with special agents on temporary assignment from Secret Service field offices.

The White House Detail protects the President on trips within the U.S. and abroad. It arranges for all security and coordinates efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and local law enforcement agencies in the area a President visits, making sure that all areas are safe and secure and no surveillance devices are in use.

Since 1998 the Secret Service has been responsible for the design and implementation of an operation security plan for national Special Security Events such as the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics, the Democratic and Republican Conventions, the G-8 Economic Summit and Presidential Inaugurations.

The Diplomatic Security Service within the State Department is responsible for providing permanent protection for the Secretary of State. They also provide ongoing protection detail on the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and foreign dignitaries and diplomats not specifically covered by the Secret Service. This would include Foreign Dignitaries below the level of Heads of State. Protection is offered on the basis of perceived threat level and the country’s willingness to provide the same level of protection to our diplomats in their country. Some of the people who have received protection over the years include foreign ministers, former heads of state, members of the British Royal family, representatives of the Middle East peace delegations, the Secretary General of NATO, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, Boris Yeltsin, Nelson Mandela and the Dalai Lama. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s Office of Foreign Missions is responsible for the protection of foreign embassies and consulates on U.S. soil. Since they do not have a true uniformed force with police powers, other agencies or local police departments are reimbursed for providing service. The DSS also protects certain Ambassadors overseas. The protection detail for the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq is one of the largest critical threat protection details in the history of the DSS. The DSS has also protected or does protect the Presidents of Afghanistan, Haiti and Liberia in their home countries.

As part of the Secret Service’s mission of preventing an incident before it occurs, the agency relies on meticulous advance work and threat assessments developed by its Intelligence Division. They cannot rely solely on human resources and physical barriers but also address the role and inherent vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures upon which security plans are built.
For an event such as a state funeral, teams of Secret Service personnel travel in advance and conduct site surveys, assessing needs for manpower, equipment, hospitals and evacuation routes for emergences. Fire, rescue and other public service personnel in the community are alerted.
Before a protectee arrives at any site, a lead advance agent coordinates all law enforcement representatives participating in the visit, for this State Funeral it would be the NYPD, military, federal, state and county local law enforcement. Public safety organizations are also a vital part of the entire security operation. Intelligence information is discussed and emergency options are outlined. Prior to the arrival of the protectee, checkpoints are established and access to the secured area is limited. During the visit/event Secret Service and local law enforcement personnel form a network of support for members of the detail working in close proximity to the protectee.

A Secret Service command post is set up for the event. The command post acts as the communication center for protective activities, monitors emergences and keeps participants in contact with one another. In the command post agents don’t wear earpieces and carry their weapons discreetly.

The Secret Service works with a core group of hotels in NYC. Since they are there all year long they’ve built up relationships. The command post is likely to be in a hotel suite, as it was for the Republican Convention. The space was described as follows, “Two floors of a hotel with impressive Manhattan views in an undisclosed location. Thick blue bundles of secure fiber-optic communications lines, attached with duct tape to the hotel carpets, snake through the corridors. Cheerful suites had been transformed into operational centers, with desks, communal work tables and walls covered with notated scheduling boards and scribbled-upon 2004 calendars, convention posters and a panoply of plans: city maps, schematics and diagrams of Madison Square Garden. In the coordinator’s office, a mammoth bookcase held 50 fat volumes of contingency plans for the convention. Work tables, though jumbled with pens, cellphones, hand-held computers and electronic calculators nevertheless seemed tidy; there was an absence of the old pizza crusts and half-empty soda cans that would characterize the nerdy—or, certainly, journalistic –workspace. The sole concession to the junk imperative was a giant, nearly empty jar of Utz pretzels in the housing section.”

After the visit, agents analyze every step of the protective operation, record unusual incidents and suggest improvements for the future.

The Secret Service New York Field Office is its largest field operation, employing over 200 personnel. For events such as the United Nations General Assembly an additional 100 employees will be brought in. For the Republican Convention the Secret Service needed to provide the basics for well over 1,00 special agents, uniformed officers and military personnel supporting the service. This is covers everything from protective duty to counter-sniper teams, bomb squads and canine units.

White House:
The White House is guarded by 500 Uniformed Division officers of the Secret Service, who patrol the outer and middle perimeters. The inner perimeter and the mansion itself are secured by more than 100 agents in civilian clothes from the Presidential Protective Detail. The Technical Security Division guards against surveillance and bugging of the White House and screens all visitors for weapons. All packages entering the White House are examined.
The Secret service’s Office of Protective Operations provides security at the White House and other Presidential offices, at the official residence of the Vice President and at foreign diplomatic missions in Washington D.C. and throughout the U.S.

The White House Detail is assigned to the President. It protects the President in the Oval office (a button enables him to summon agents at any time). It makes sure there are no surveillance devices in use in the White House.

Russian Protection of Dignitaries:
The Federal Protective Service (FSO), formerly the Ninth Chief Directorate of the KGB, is responsible for the protection of Russian state property and high-ranking government personnel, including the President of Russia by the special unit – The Kremlin Regiment. The FSO is a powerful institution with a range of rights and powers, including the right to conduct searches and surveillance without warrants, make arrests, and give orders to other state agencies. It’s rumored that Putin uses the FSO to keep an eye on current Russian President Medvedev. Right now 30 people are protective by the Federal Protective Service including 7 presidential plenipotentiaries in the federal districts. They also provide security for high profile foreign guests to Russia.

VIP Security Research Sources

Secret Service:
http://www.answers.com/topic/u-s-secret-service
The U.S. Secret Service is a unit of the Department of the Treasury that is responsible for ensuring the safety of the President and Vice President and their families, the President-elect and Vice President-elect and their families, major Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates and their families, and former Presidents and their families. The Secret Service also protects visiting heads of foreign states or governments and other foreign visitors to the United States when designated to do so by the President.

The director of the Secret Service is chosen by the secretary of the Treasury from the ranks of service personnel. The 1,800 special enforcement agents are trained in hand-to-hand combat, firearms, emergency medicine, safe and evasive driving, surveillance, and field investigation at the Federal Law Enforcement Facility in Brunswick, Georgia, and the service's school in Beltsville, Maryland.

The Secret Service's Office of Protective Operations provides security at the White House and other Presidential offices, at the official residence of the Vice President in the District of Columbia, and at foreign diplomatic missions in Washington, D.C., and throughout the United States.

The White House Detail is assigned to the President. It protects the President in the Oval Office (a button enables him to summon agents at any time) and on trips within the United States and abroad. It arranges for all security and coordinates efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local law enforcement agencies in the area a President visits, making sure that all areas are safe and secure. It ensures that no surveillance devices are in use in the White House or any place the President visits.

The Office of Protective Research conducts background checks on individuals who have made threats against the President or other people protected by the Secret Service. It keeps tabs on more than 50,000 individuals who are viewed as potential threats to the President. Some 400 people on the “watch list” are placed under surveillance when the President is in their vicinity.


The White House is guarded by 500 Uniformed Division officers of the Secret Service, who patrol the outer and middle perimeters. The inner perimeter and the mansion itself are secured by more than 100 agents in civilian clothes from the Presidential Protective Detail. The Technical Security Division guards against surveillance and bugging of the White House, and agents screen all visitors to the White House for weapons. All packages entering the White House are examined. Each year about 250 mentally disturbed people and 400 visitors carrying guns are apprehended as they enter the White House on guided tours.




HOW PROTECTION WORKS

Protective Operations
http://www.ustreas.gov/usss/protection_works.shtml
The Secret Service is world-renowned for the physical protection it provides to the nation's highest elected leaders and other government officials. To safeguard Secret Service protectees, the agency does not generally discuss the specific types and methods of its security operations.

The Secret Service is world-renowned for the physical protection it provides to the nation's highest elected leaders and other government officials.


In general, permanent protectees, such as the president and first lady, have details of special agents permanently assigned to them. Temporary protectees, such as candidates and foreign dignitaries, are staffed with special agents on temporary assignment from Secret Service field offices. All current former presidents are entitled to lifetime Secret Service protection. However, as a result of legislation enacted in 1997, President George W. Bush will be the first president to have his protection limited to 10 years after he leaves office.

The protection of an individual is comprehensive and goes well beyond surrounding the individual with well-armed agents. As part of the Secret Service's mission of preventing an incident before it occurs, the agency relies on meticulous advance work and threat assessments developed by its Intelligence Division to identify potential risks to protectees.

Advances in technology and the world's reliance on interdependent network systems also have changed the Secret Service's protective responsibilities. No longer can law enforcement rely solely on human resources and physical barriers in designing a security plan; agencies also must address the role and inherent vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures upon which security plans are built.

Protective Visits
In general, for protective visits, teams of Secret Service personnel travel in advance and conduct site surveys, which assess needs for manpower, equipment, hospitals and evacuation routes for emergencies. Fire, rescue and other public service personnel in the community are alerted.
Before a protectee arrives at any site, a lead advance agent coordinates all law enforcement representatives participating in the visit. Intelligence information is discussed and emergency options are outlined. Prior to the arrival of the protectee, checkpoints are established and access to the secured area is limited.

The assistance of the military, federal, state, county and local law enforcement, and the public safety organizations is a vital part of the entire security operation. During protective visits, Secret Service and local law enforcement personnel form a network of support for members of the detail working in close proximity to the protectee. A Secret Service command post acts as the communication center for protective activities, monitors emergencies and keeps all participants in contact with one another. After the visit, agents analyze every step of the protective operation, record unusual incidents and suggest improvements for the future.

Protective Research
Protective research is an integral component of all security operations. Agents and specialists assigned to conduct protective research evaluate information received from law enforcement, intelligence agencies and a variety of other sources regarding individuals or groups who may pose a threat to Secret Service protectees. These agents review questionable letters and e-mails received at the White House and maintain a 24-hour operation to coordinate protection-related information.


SPOTLIGHT ON: BARBARA RIGGS
http://pccw.alumni.cornell.edu/news/newsletters/spring06/riggs.html
We're turning the spotlight on Barbara Riggs, a new member of PCCW, who was the first woman Deputy Director of the Secret Service. She retired on Jan. 31 after a 31-year career that took her to every continent - except Antarctica - in her work protecting six presidents - Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. In a Q&A with eNewsletter, she recounts many fascinating experiences, including riding horses with President Reagan at Camp David and Rancho del Cielo in California and accompanying his casket aboard Air Force One from California to Washington, D.C., for his state funeral. She also talks about her pride in having a Cornell education, reminding herself at difficult moments: "I am a Cornell graduate, I know I am mentally and intellectually capable of doing anything I put my mind to."

How did I get to the Secret Service from Cornell?

While at Cornell, I majored in International Studies and Spanish. I intended to go to law school and then go into the Foreign Service. I had lived in Chile and Nicaragua previously, so I was very keen on working for the State Department and living overseas.

While taking a seminar on Constitutional Law offered to undergraduates by the Cornell Law School, I met a man (Win Lawson) who worked for the Secret Service. He was spending the year at Cornell participating in a government program that sent senior executives back to graduate school to earn a Master's Degree in Public Administration. We were both students in this seminar. At the end of the semester (spring semester, junior year, 1974), he asked me if I would be interested in becoming a special agent in the Secret Service. My response to him was: "Do they hire women?" He proudly responded that the Secret Service employed five (5) women as special agents!!! Naturally, I was intrigued, so I began the interview process in the summer of 1974.

During my first interview with the Special Agent in Charge in the Syracuse Field Office, he asked me if my application was a joke; he wanted to know if my sorority sisters had put me up to this. I was highly offended and told him so. I really thought that would be the end of my application, but when I concluded my course work at Cornell for my degree in December 1974 the Secret Service offered me a position as a special agent in the Washington DC Field Office on January 20, 1975. I was the 10th woman hired as a special agent in the then 110 year history of the organization.

What qualifications/background does one need to work for the Secret Service?
The Secret Service is a federal law enforcement agency first established as a secret entity within the Department of the Treasury in 1865 for the sole purpose of suppressing the rampant counterfeiting of bank notes. In the post-Civil War environment, between 1/3-1/2 of the bank notes in circulation were counterfeit, threatening the stability of the economy. President Abraham Lincoln authorized the creation of the Secret Service on April 14, 1865, one of his last official acts. That evening he went to watch a play at Ford's Theater where he was mortally wounded by James Wilkes Booth. It wasn't until three presidents were assassinated (Lincoln, Garfield, and McKinley) that Congress authorized physical protection for the president. This mission was given to the Secret Service and its first presidential "protectee" was Teddy Roosevelt.

Despite this new protection mandate, the Secret Service continued its criminal investigative mission. Over the last century and a half, Congress has given the Secret Service statutory authority to investigate criminal activity relative to bank fraud, access device fraud (credit/debit card), telecommunications fraud, and computer fraud. 
Electronic crimes (e.g. cyber intrusions) represent the fastest growing area of criminal activity the Secret Service is addressing in the 21st century. Basically, any criminal activity impacting the financial payment systems of the U.S. economy, the Secret Service investigates.

The protection mission has also grown since 1901. In addition to the President, the Secret Service now has the statutory responsibility to protect the First Family, the Vice President and family, presidential candidates, and all visiting Heads of State and Heads of Government to visit the United States. The Secret Service is also responsible for the security of the White House complex and the Vice President's residence. And since 1998 the Secret Service has been responsible for the design and implementation of an operation security plan for National Special Security Events such as the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympics, the Democratic and Republican Conventions, the G-8 Economic Summit and Presidential Inaugurations.

The Secret Service has evolved into a dual mission agency over the last 141 years. Currently, the staffing level is at about 6500 employees. The largest group of employees is the special agents (approximately 3300). At minimum a college degree is required for the special agent position. The special agent population represents a very diverse group educationally. Many of the agents have law degrees, MBAs, Masters; a few have a PhD. These are the individuals who conduct the criminal investigations and are assigned to physical protection details such as the President, Vice President or foreign dignitaries. The Secret Service has over 100 field offices throughout the United States and the world (the foreign presence is growing because crime is transnational in nature, primarily due to the growth of the Internet). The training for a new special agent covers a 6 month period where you receive comprehensive training and education in the two core missions (criminal investigations and protection), physical fitness, defensive measures and firearms.

Like any modern law enforcement agency, our employees are not exclusively special agents. The Secret Service also employs intelligence and criminal research specialists; civil, mechanical and software engineers; chemists; biologists; behavioral psychologists; information technology specialists; physical security specialists, forensic scientists and fingerprint analysts. If you think of the spectrum of threats the Secret Service must protect against, and the laboratory analysis associated with the criminal investigative work, you can understand the necessity to have the technical and scientific expertise provided by the aforementioned positions.

What are some of your most memorable experiences?

During my 31 year career, I traveled to every continent but Antarctica and visited every state in the Union. I served with six different presidents (Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush-41, Clinton and Bush-43). I literally saw history in the making, so there are many memorable moments and experiences.

I often rode horses with President Reagan, both at Camp David and at his Rancho del Cielo, north of Santa Barbara, California. These rides provided a unique opportunity to interact one on one with the President, and engage in long conversations while riding side by side. He was a fabulous storyteller and jokester. He loved his horses and cherished the time he was able to take to ride.

While out riding one of my own horses, I had fallen and suffered a concussion. I was scheduled to travel to Japan and Korea with the President but could not because of this injury. After President Reagan returned from his trip, and once I returned to work, he called me upstairs to his private living room in the White House. He handed me a book entitled “The Principles of Horsemanship” and with a wink, laughingly suggested I read it before riding again.

In June 2005, after his death, I had the honor of accompanying his casket aboard Air Force One from California to Washington D.C. for his State Funeral. I will never forget the thousands of people lining Constitution Avenue as the casket was carried from the south side of the White House to the Capitol. All of the official events associated with his funeral were incredible and I had the opportunity to attend all of them.

In 1991 or 1992, I was in Japan with President Bush (41). While attending a State Dinner at the Japanese Prime Minister’s official residence, the President collapsed during the dinner and was unconscious. During this medical emergency, it was very interesting how the Japanese hosts and guests reacted. As we swung into action responding to the President, we gave instructions by hand signals for everyone to be seated. Amazingly, everyone complied and we were able to quietly revive and evacuate the President. I often thought afterwards that if that incident had happened in the United States, the reaction would have been one of chaos.

I could go on and on with anecdotal stories about:

Close encounters with presidents in their birthday suits
Attending a dinner with Mrs. Bush in Saudi Arabia and taking in all of the jewelry worn by the Saudi women (I now know who keeps Tiffany’s and Winston’s in business)
Being stalked by Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega while on assignment in Panama, and living to tell the story
Taking the test ride all around the country on the new Air Force One (Boeing 747) to test all the systems as it came off-line (before it was commissioned).
Playing jokes on President Reagan and President Bush (41).
Behind the scene tour of the Kremlin with the KGB
Landing in Marine One on the lawns of Buckingham Palace and Windsor Castle
Personal meetings with Pope John Paul II, Canadian Prime Minister, King Juan Carlos of Spain and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel.

These examples give you a pretty good idea of the adventures I experienced.

What was one of the most difficult or dangerous situations you were involved in?
September 11, 2001.
The Secret Service New York Field Office is its largest field operation, employing over 200 personnel. An additional 100 employees were in New York to plan, implement and staff the foreign dignitary details for the upcoming United Nations General Assembly.

Once the first plane hit, we implemented emergency evacuation plans for our field office located in World Trade Center #7. All these individuals were in the process of being evacuated when the second plane hit. While the Secret Service law enforcement personnel assisted NYPD and NYFD evacuate the towers, the administrative staff and temporary personnel were escorted to safety. Secret Service Special Officer Craig Miller was killed while assisting in the evacuation of one of the towers. Later that day, the USSS New York Field Office was lost as World Trade Center #7 collapsed.

Thru monitoring radar and activating an open line with the FAA, the Secret Service was able to receive real time information about other hijacked aircraft. We were tracking two hijacked aircraft as they approached Washington, D.C. and our assumption was that the White House was a target. While the White House was evacuated, the Secret Service prepared to defend the facility.

Concurrently, the Secret Service was safely relocating all of its protectees (First Lady, VP et al). The President’s movements of that day are public record. Every impromptu stop involved a Secret Service field office coordinating with local, state, federal and military entities to secure motorcade routes and sites, with little advance notice.

Additionally, the Secret Service was instrumental in evacuating all presidential successors as enumerated by the 25th Amendment.

I was present in the Director’s Crisis Center located at USSS Headquarters as a member of the Director’s senior staff overseeing our activities nationwide.

These few paragraphs inadequately describe the activities-and the emotions-of the day. Everyone expected additional attacks. Our focus, however, was on our mission: the safety of those we protect and the safety of our employees. And this focus was intense.

Did I find that being a woman worked to your advantage?
Early in my career I had the opportunity to work undercover during criminal investigations. This worked to my advantage because there were so few woman special agents at the time; no one suspected my true identity.

When I was first assigned to President Reagan’s protective detail, I was one of only two women. He conducted himself on a first name basis with us, whereas with the men, he did not know all their individual names. Furthermore, because I rode horses with the President, I developed a close personal relationship with him.

When I first began working for the Secret Service in 1975, I was one of only ten women special agents. The Secret Service was created in 1865 and had employed only men as special agents until 1971. So you can imagine the glass ceilings we had to break to progress in our careers. Almost every assignment I had was a “first for a female special agent.”

How did your career progress the way it did. How did you continue to move up the ranks?
The Secret Service has two core missions: criminal investigations and protection. In order to be competitive for promotion it is important to get experience operationally in both areas. I did this by transferring to different assignments: the Washington Field Office, Intelligence Division, Presidential Protection Division, Los Angeles Field Office, New York Field Office, Office of the Director, Inspection Division etc.

When I entered the Secret Service I did not know where this career would take me, or that I would even stay an entire career. I just approached my work as a professional and worked very hard. Yes, I encountered sexual harassment, barriers and attitudes that believed women should not be law enforcement agents. There were some who did not believe women were capable, either physically or mentally, to do the job. I chose not to believe that. There were times I told myself: “I am a Cornell graduate, I know I am mentally and intellectually capable of doing anything I put my mind to.”

But I also encountered many individuals who acted as my mentor and gave me great opportunities. I would say mentorship was the greatest factor that allowed me to progress.
One example was my assignment to the Presidential Protection Division as a supervisor during the presidency of George Bush Sr. I was the first woman in the history of the organization to hold one of these positions in 1990-1992. As one of the supervisors, I was responsible for directing the security arrangements for the President, whether at the White House or traveling domestically or internationally. And it happened because the Assistant Director of Protective Operations gave me the opportunity to do it, against the recommendation of other senior leaders in the Secret Service. Their opposition was based on gender, not capability.

This assignment was pivotal to later career advancements because the Special Agent in Charge of the President’s Detail (the person I reported to) later became the Director. This individual later gave me the opportunity to enter executive ranks of the Secret Service.

The current Director was appointed by the President in January 2003. I was planning to retire, but he asked me to stay to help him with his transition and to help transition the Secret Service to the Department of Homeland Security. Since 1865 the Secret Service had been an agency within the Department of the Treasury, but was transferred to this new department in 2003. This represented a huge transition for all the agencies transferring to Homeland Security. I agreed to stay to help him and he appointed me as his Chief of Staff. In September 2004, the Secretary of Homeland Security appointed me as the Deputy Director, a position I held until my retirement on January 31, 2006.

What were some of the goofy aliases?
Although special agents work undercover during criminal investigations, it is not “deep cover” requiring false names or aliases. This type of cover would apply more to the work of agents for the FBI or CIA.

Will I prepare memoirs?
I have been approached by an English professor at Berkeley who would like to write my story. I am undecided.


New York Times: August 26, 2004
PREPARING FOR THE CONVENTION: SECURITY; Behind the Line of Fire http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B04E0D9133EF935A1575BC0A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=print

By GLENN COLLINS

You would think that New York's first Republican convention in Al Qaeda's most detested city would be the biggest test in the history of the Secret Service.
After all, special agents and uniformed Secret Service officers from across America have been ordered to report to New York City. They need to be matched with their assignments, dropped into hotel rooms and provided with vehicles.

The Secret Service acknowledges that this is a complex operation. ''It's all a puzzle, and it has to be pieced together,'' said Steven G. Hughes, the Secret Service coordinator for the Republican National Convention.

But any further hyperbole is deflated by Mr. Hughes, with a calm ''we've done this before.'' Lodging, he said, was harder to come by at the Group of Eight meeting in Sea Island, Ga., in June. At the 2002 Winter Olympics in Utah, Mr. Hughes said, the Secret Service was responsible for protecting a 900-square-mile area in potentially frigid conditions so agents had to be issued insulated yellow parkas to keep them unfrozen.
As for parking, many of the agents will not need cars, Mr. Hughes noted, because ''they will be able to take the subway.''

But he is certainly aware that his agents are part of history's most enormous police and military presence at any convention. The Secret Service alone must provide the basics for well over 1,000 special agents, uniformed officers and military personnel supporting the service. This force is assigned to everything from protective duty to counter-sniper teams, bomb squads and canine units.

In the temporary New York field office of the Secret Service, the agents responsible for making it all happen wear no earpieces, and weapons are carried discreetly.

For they are not members of the legendary Secret Service details who parachute into cities and hamlets, ever on toes, as they put it, prepared to interpose their bodies between those they are guarding and an imminent threat. Instead, these unsung deskbound agents are the stalwarts of the little-known logistical sections, which address the mundane but infinite minutiae that help their glam counterparts to swoop in, and then swoop out. Though the Secret Service will not say exactly how many agents are coming to New York, this question arises: How will they house, feed and transport their assets at parsimonious government rates in one of the world's most expensive cities, where most hotel rooms have been booked a year in advance?

Enter Mr. Hughes, an assistant to the special agent in charge of the dignitary-protection division in Washington. He moved from there to the service's New York field office in March 2003 to begin planning for the convention, which will officially begin on Monday.

Mr. Hughes, 39, a wiry 14-year Secret Service veteran in a dark blue suit, blue-striped shirt and a yellow tie with jaunty little palm trees, started his career in the New York field office before working on the details of former President Bill Clinton and President Bush.

He does not look like Clint Eastwood, the special agent in the 1993 film ''In the Line of Fire,'' but with his keen blue eyes Mr. Hughes bears some resemblance to Pierce Brosnan. Apprised of this, Mr. Hughes laughed and said that his offspring saw in his features ''a little Shrek look.''

And that is all he would say about his family, save that they had joined him in New York.
The Secret Service declined to disclose its part of the $50 million allocated by Congress for the Republican convention, but it is poised to cope with the imponderables of terrorist threats and the concentrated displeasure of hundreds of thousands of protesters.

This current mission of the Secret Service is the fifth National Special Security Event -- a level designated by the Department of Homeland Security -- in the last year, Mr. Hughes pointed out. (The others were the State of the Union speech, the Group of Eight meeting, the funeral of President Ronald Reagan, and the Democratic National Convention in Boston.)
Only after noting the difficulties of these previous assignments did Mr. Hughes acknowledge in his low-key way that protecting the president and the convention in post-Sept. 11 New York ''is certainly a challenge.''

The Secret Service was the lead federal agency in designing the protective umbrella that will enfold the president, former President George Bush, cabinet members and, indeed, the entire Madison Square Garden complex. Now it is responsible for its putting the plan in place.
In this huge security effort, which involves some 66 federal, state and local agencies, temporary quarters might be expected to be spartan. However, the Secret Service operations squads do not occupy a grim, airless basement bunker adjacent to an airshaft. No, they have two floors of a hotel with impressive Manhattan views in an undisclosed location. (The New York Times visited the site after agreeing not to reveal some of the agency's convention operations.) Thick blue bundles of secure fiber-optic communications lines, attached with duct tape to the hotel carpets, snake through the corridors.

Cheerful suites had been transformed into operational centers, with desks, communal work tables and walls covered with notated scheduling boards and scribbled-upon 2004 calendars, convention posters and a panoply of plans: city maps, schematics and diagrams of Madison Square Garden. In the coordinator's office, a mammoth bookcase held 50 fat volumes of contingency plans for the convention.

Work tables, though jumbled with pens, cellphones, hand-held computers and electronic calculators nevertheless seemed tidy; there was an absence of the old pizza crusts and half-empty soda cans that would characterize the nerdy -- or, certainly, journalistic -- workspace. The sole concession to the junk imperative was a giant, nearly empty jar of Utz pretzels in the housing section.
In the operations room, special agents began scrutinizing a new list of reinforcements that would be arriving imminently. ''Now it's our job to plug all the people into their assignments,'' Mr. Hughes said.

The list of special agents that had just emanated from headquarters in Washington was comprehensive but not entirely definitive; at the 11th hour, some agents were discovered to be unavailable for convention duty because of grand jury testimony in criminal cases, or family emergencies.

Now replacement agents were being sought to fill those slots ''in a domino effect,'' said a 33-year-old agent who declined to give her name, or to be photographed, because she will be rotated out to protective or other duties that could require anonymity.
By the end of the week, an attentive horde of agents would be assembled at a briefing in a hotel ballroom at, yes, an undisclosed location. They would be exhorted, and tasked, by A.T. Smith, special agent in charge of the New York field office. All agents would be greeted by the Secret Service equivalent of the Welcome Wagon: a packet containing their assignments and essential information.

Lodging is always a function of the geography of any assignment; in the past, the agency has used trailers, private apartments, town houses, dorm rooms and tents. Ann Roman, a Secret Service spokeswoman, said that ''it's never one size fits all,'' adding: ''There is no blueprint. Every location is different.''

In New York, many agents will be housed in hotels, and a considerable number will not be doubling up. Given conflicting shift schedules -- one agent might have to report for duty at 4 a.m. for a shift of 12 to 14 hours, while a roommate might have to report at noon -- room-sharing might make for ill-rested agents in demanding jobs.
The Secret Service works with a core group of hotels in Manhattan. ''We're here all year long,'' said one special agent, a five-year veteran in his early 30's, who declined to give his name or be photographed. ''We build relationships with hotels; we know them, and they know us.'' He smiled. ''It's an art.''

It is also an art to find pet-friendly rooms, to accommodate the canine units that will be occupying them.
New York was, in fact, the first headquarters of the Secret Service back in 1865, declaring war on counterfeiters. Nowadays presidents, their families and foreign digs, as the agents call foreign dignitaries, are constantly visiting the city for everything from formal visits to shoppertunities. There is also the year-round office presence for Mr. Clinton, and the responsibility of covering frequent visits by his wife, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton.

Although the government per diem for a room is about $200 a night, the minimum rate for some of the Secret Service hotels is close to $300 a night. However, the service will not exceed its per diem, and often negotiates for bulk room discounts. Why do the hotels play let's make a deal? ''We use a lot of hotel rooms year round, even in the slow season,'' the agent said. The Secret Service also relies on the simple motivation of patriotism; some hotel managers, they say, are proud to put them up.

And if, after all that, the president accepts his nomination and is safely whisked back to Washington, what will be the reward of the logistics team, aside from a powerful sense of achievement?

Here it is: The temporary field office will remain up and running. That's because the Secret Service must do it all over again starting Sept. 14, when dozens of heads of state begin arriving to address the 59th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

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Diplomatic Security Service:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diplomatic_Security_Service
http://www.state.gov/m/ds/

DSS is the agency identified to accept high threat protection assignments around the globe. The largest permanent dignitary protection detail carried out by DSS agents is on the Secretary of State (currently Condoleezza Rice). DSS also has an ongoing protection detail on the United States Ambassador to the United Nations (Zalmay Khalilzad).

Most all other 'details' are on visiting foreign dignitaries and diplomats, and are on a temporary basis for the duration of a dignitary's visit. Foreign Ministers from important nations, as well as those with threats, are typically covered by DSS.

DSS has the authority to provide protection for Foreign Heads of State, and did so through the early 1970s. At that time there was an order signed by President Richard Nixon also giving this authority to the Secret Service (USSS), which has protected heads of state ever since.
DSS agents have protected such people as Prince Charles, Princess Diana, Yasser Arafat, the Dalai Lama, and Boris Yeltsin (in the days preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union).[2]

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Office of Foreign Missions is responsible for the protection of foreign embassies and consulates on U.S. soil[3]. Since the DSS does not have a true uniformed force with police powers, other agencies or local police departments are reimbursed for providing this service. Most notably the Uniformed Secret Service in Washington, DC and the New York City Police Department in New York city.

During the annual UN General Assembly in September, DSS, as well as the USSS, protects many dozens of varied dignitaries, mostly in New York City. DSS may also provide protection to others as assigned, including foreign persons without any government status, but who might have a threat against them. DSS also protects certain US Ambassadors overseas. Currently, the protection detail for the US Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, is one of the largest critical threat protection details in the history of DSS. DSS has also protected or does protect the Presidents of Afghanistan, Haiti and Liberia. What makes these 'details' unique is that the protection, done by U.S. federal agents - DSS, is carried out overseas, in the protected person's home country.

Diplomatic Security: State Department site
http://www.state.gov/m/ds/about/overview/c9010.htm

Diplomatic Security protects more dignitaries than any other agency in the U.S. Government. DS special agents guard the Secretary of State 24 hours a day, seven days a week, everywhere she or he goes in the world.

In addition to the Secretary, our agents protect the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and foreign dignitaries below the level of head of state who visit the United States (approximately 150 each year). Protection is afforded to a foreign dignitary on the basis of perceived threat level and that country's willingness to provide the same level of protection for our diplomats in their country. Through the years, DS has provided security to a diverse number of individuals. Among those foreign dignitaries who have received DS protection are foreign ministers, former heads of state, members of the British royal family, representatives of the Middle East peace delegations, the Secretary General of NATO, Palestinian Authority Chairman Yassar Arafat, Boris Yeltsin and Nelson Mandela (prior to their becoming heads of state), and the Dalai Lama.
Each fall, DS protects about 30 foreign dignitaries in New York during the United Nations General Assembly, a very personnel-intensive and demanding event. Preparations for UNGA begin in January and continue through early September, when virtually every special agent moves to New York for the duration of the General Assembly.

DS also provides security for special events. In recent years, DS agents protected the Israeli and Syrian foreign ministers during the Israel-Syria Peace Talks held in Shepherdstown, WV in 1999. More recently, DS agents worked in Salt Lake City at the 2002 Winter Olympics to protect athletes, visiting dignitaries, and sites. Currently, DS is working closely with the Greek Government on security issues surrounding the 2004 Olympics.

PROTECTION OF FOREIGN DIGNITARIES AND MISSIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
..
The United States has the responsibility under international law to protect visiting foreign dignitaries and resident foreign diplomats in this country. There is an equally serious obligation to protect foreign missions in Washington, New York, and other cities in the United States. Unlike some other nations that use a single protective force, visiting foreign dignitaries/diplomats and foreign missions in the United States are protected by a wide variety of local, state, and federal organizations. In Washington, foreign missions are protected by the Uniformed Division of the Secret Service with support from the Metropolitan Police Department. The premises of foreign missions in New York and consulates in various cities are normally protected by the municipal police departments. Traveling foreign dignitaries are usually protected by the Secret Service or Department of State, and some defense officials may be protected by one of the services in the Department of Defense. Other federal agencies infrequently protect a visiting foreign official, either at the request of the Department of State or of their own volition. Resident foreign diplomats may receive protective services from the Department of State, local police authorities, or private security firms.

The Panel is disturbed by the diffusion of protective responsibility within our government that is perhaps best exemplified by the inexplicable current practice in which the Secret Service protects a visiting Head of State or Government while the Department of State's Security protects that individual's family and/or the accompanying foreign minister. Often both protective details take place simultaneously. In order to fulfill our international obligations, we must provide for a safe and secure environment for those officials visiting our country. As we raise the level of professionalism of our services, we can demand greater support and security for our own personnel overseas.

Protecting officials from harm today no longer means just having a Bodyguard nor is it a simple task of physically shielding the individual from attack. Days or weeks are spent in preparation for a single visit. Thus, the agencies recruit qualified personnel and expend months of training to teach these individuals the complicated concepts, methods, and techniques of protective security. The same concepts that apply to protecting our diplomats and residential areas abroad apply to protecting visiting foreign officials and their residences in the United States.

The Panel recommends a significant increase in the funding and resources dedicated to the protection of foreign dignitaries and missions in the United States than currently budgeted or anticipated. The Panel believes that the resources expended for the protection of foreign officials and missions in this country have been largely insufficient in the past. Demands for protective services continue to rise as more nations and officials are subjected to the threat of terrorist acts. The issue of reciprocity demands that we provide comparable protection to that which we expect overseas.


The Inman Report - Report of the Secretary of State's
Advisory Panel on Overseas Security
http://fas.org/irp/threat/inman/part09.htm
Protection of Visiting Foreign Officials
The authority for the protection of visiting foreign dignitaries is currently divided between the Department of State's Office of Security and the United States Secret Service, and to a much lesser extent, other federal agencies (including the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense). Both the Secret Service and the Office of Security have legal authority for the protection of Chiefs of State or Heads of Government.

The legislation contained in 18 United States Code 3056 outlining the Secret Service powers states that subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secret Service is authorized to protect the person of a visiting head of a foreign state or foreign government and, at the direction of the President, other distinguished foreign visitors to the United States and official representatives of the United States performing special missions abroad. Thus, the Secret Service routinely provides protective services to every visiting Chief of State or Head of Government unless that person declines the services in writing. The only other officials protected by the Secret Service are those whom the President specifically directs the Service to protect. Therefore, when the Department of State began receiving protective requests from foreign governments for a number of officials such as Presidents-elect, former Presidents and Prime Ministers, Cabinet level ministers, opposition leaders and other important dignitaries, the Secret Service pointed out its lack of authority for protecting these officials whom it was not Presidentially directed to protect and it refused to assume the additional responsibilities. Therefore, commencing in the mid 1970's, the Office of Security again was tasked with providing protective security to all dignitaries other than current Chiefs of State or Heads of Government.
The Office of Security has applied its broad authority primarily to the protection of certain cabinet level officials, primary family members of Chiefs of State/Heads of Government and persons of royalty. Often this protection was and is based on the principle of reciprocity and not solely on the presence of a specific threat. The role of local or state law enforcement agencies in the protection of visiting foreign officials (as opposed to resident diplomats is generally that of a supportive nature to the federal agencies involved.

The Panel concentrated its study on the two agencies that provide the bulk of the dignitary protection in this country; the Secret Service and the Department of State's Office of Security. Although the Panel has been informed of sporadic successful cooperative efforts between the two agencies, the successes have been the result of individual efforts and not because of an institutional sense of cooperation or agreed-upon standards.

The Panel sought the views of both the Office of Security and the Secret Service. The organizations have differing viewpoints. The Office of Security is willing to take on protective responsibility for all foreign officials provided that it is given additional resources and authority. The Secret Service insists that additional responsibilities would dilute its primary mission of protecting the President of the United States, and it firmly indicated its opposition to the assumption of additional responsibilities. This served as a catalyst in leading the Panel to recommend the creation of a Diplomatic Security Service within the Department of State. The Panel believes that the new Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Diplomatic Security Service should ultimately be responsible for the protection of all visiting foreign officials and resident diplomats/missions when a sufficient level of professionalism has been established.
The Panel believes that the staffing and training levels of protective personnel must be significantly improved before any added protective responsibilities are placed in the Department of State. The reorganization of the security functions into the Diplomatic Security Service will be difficult. For these reasons, it is important that responsibility for the protection of Chiefs of State/Heads of Government be delayed until this new organization is prepared to absorb the responsibility in an orderly and professional manner, taking into consideration adequate staffing levels and training programs. The Panel recommends that after thorough review from both an interagency working group and training personnel, the Department and new Diplomatic Security Service determine its long range goals in the area of dignitary protection. It should fully identify its resource and equipment needs and then comprehensively budget for them.
The Panel notes that most of the further recommendations listed in this section deal with short term "fixes" -- not long term solutions. However, there are a number of ways to improve the coordination efforts of the Department of State and the Secret Service that will result in a better quality of protective services provided.

The first step in improving the services provided is the identification of the problems and solutions. Thus, the Panel believes that the Department of State and the Secret Service could benefit from the establishment of a formal working group comprised of knowledgeable members of both services. The group should set acceptable standards after studying a broad array of topics involving protective security requirements.

The Panel believes that training is one of the most vital elements of any professional program. Recent court decisions are making clear that an organization can be liable for actions of an employee who has been either improperly trained or has not been afforded the training necessary to carry out his or her job. The Panel understands that the Department has not had the resources available to devote to training but the problem is critical and requires immediate attention. Therefore, the Department of State should contract with the Department of Treasury for the Secret Service to undertake comprehensive protective training for the agents of the Department of State. The training should consider the unique problems in protecting our officials and facilities overseas.

The Panel has already noted the overlapping responsibilities of the Secret Service and Office of Security. Yet, it appears to the Panel that there has been a lack of communication and information exchange between the two agencies in the past. Professional respect is the key to future progress. An exchange program between the Secret Service and Diplomatic Security Service could foster better cooperation and understanding.

Protecting officials sometimes involves long and strenuous hours that not everyone can maintain. An exhausted or physically incapable person may be more of a danger than an asset. Protective techniques are evolving in sophistication as terrorists continue to target those highly placed, visible officials. A set of standards outlining the level of physical and mental preparedness required is necessary and should be developed and implemented.

Often, a prominent official who is subject to threats requires a large and comprehensive protective detail. The ability to respond to a terrorist attack is part and parcel of comprehensive protective coverage. Not all local police agencies have highly trained response or counter assault teams. The Diplomatic Security Service should form and use its own response team when the threat against a protected official warrants this type of coverage and an adequate team cannot be provided by supporting agencies.

One way to ensure continued support for any United States Government protective detail assigned overseas is to offer relevant training to friendly foreign governments. The Panel notes that the Department of State is offering, with the help of other agencies, training for foreign civilian agencies in the Anti-Terrorist Assistance Program and it welcomes the effort. The Panel recommends that the Department of State seek to expand its training program with the goal of providing regular in-service training of its own personnel, training in protective techniques to local and state law enforcement agencies, and limited training of friendly foreign nations' police agencies (now currently in the Anti-Terrorist Assistance Program).

A well-rounded agent must have the opportunity to do other investigative and law-enforcement work that helps to hone professional skills and that provides a change of pace from the demands of protective security. The Panel believes that in order to insure the development of a professional, experienced, and well-rounded protective agent as well as a balanced career path, the Department of State should continue to rotate its agents from its investigative units to the protective area as necessary. It should continue to investigate criminal matters under its jurisdiction and appropriately staff its field offices to perform investigative, protective, and liaison duties.

The Panel believes that those blends of investigative and protective skills and functions should be combined with an aggressive program for acquiring, analyzing, and pursuing to a conclusion all forms of intelligence that appear relevant to its protective mission. This use of intelligence should be part of a system that includes proactive investigations of possibly dangerous individuals and of sources of threat information.

The Panel has noted that the Office of Security relies upon a small cadre of capable but overworked threat analysts in Washington and upon other agencies. Since terrorism is becoming more of an international phenomenon, an aggressive protective intelligence program will not only assist in the safeguarding of visiting foreign officials but it may also protect the lives of our own personnel abroad. Therefore, the Panel believes that the Department should look at the numbers and use of its intelligence resources and plan for a comprehensive protective intelligence program. The Department should then seek an appropriate number of new positions for this function.

Traditionally, Interpol has not had an active role in counterterrorism activities because of a prohibition in its by-laws. The charter has been amended and a special terrorism working group has been established. The Department of State has no representatives on Interpol. The Panel believes that the new Diplomatic Security Service, with its expanded mandate, should seek membership and devote resources to Interpol.

An important part of the provision of a safe environment is the application of state-of-the-art technology. The Panel notes that the Office of Security has skilled technical experts involved in countermeasures, armoring of cars, and developing equipment such as alarms and CC TVs. However, this small office is largely devoted to the overseas effort and the domestic protection program is suffering. A protective program must necessarily involve application of technology, and therefore, a protective technical staff is needed within the existing Office of Engineering Services.

The protective program of the Office of Security traditionally has been supported by the Office of Communications for its tactical communications needs. In order to run a professional protective program with appropriate priorities, the Panel believes that it is necessary for the Diplomatic Security Service to control all of its resources to include funds, equipment and positions. Thus, the Diplomatic Security Service should assume responsibility for its own protective communications needs to include the transfer of appropriate positions from the Office of Communications.

Protection of Foreign Missions and Resident Diplomats
The organization of the United States Government to protect foreign missions and resident foreign diplomats is shared between the Department of State, the Secret Service, and local police agencies. Although the ultimate responsibility for American obligations, as a signatory to the Vienna Conventions, belongs to the Federal Government, state and local authorities also have an obligation to assure equal protection of the law to every person within their jurisdiction.
The Panel notes that the protection afforded to diplomatic missions is typically a function of police activity as exemplified by post standing, uniformed presence, roving patrols, and marked police vehicles. The facility itself receives the protection, not individuals. For the protection of foreign missions, the Uniformed Division of the Secret Service (a federal police agency under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury) provides protective services to those missions only in the Washington, D.C. area. This protection is based upon a request by the Department of State, by a foreign government, and in conjunction with a viable threat assessment conducted by the Secret Service. The protection of foreign missions for the rest of the country is the responsibility of the Secretary of State, who has contracting and reimbursement authority, but no resources of his own to provide such protective services. Thus, even though the Secretary of State may contract with a local police agency or private firm for the provision of "extraordinary" protective services, there remain questions of timeliness, funding, and oversight of this program.
The Panel believes that the United States Government's response to the need for protection of certain diplomatic premises has been inadequate and inconsistent. The logical and most professional course of action would be the placement of the nationwide responsibility of diplomatic premise protection into one agency with broad authority and sufficient resources. The Department of State should be able to ensure a professional response to any threatened foreign mission. The personnel assigned to protect a consulate in Los Angeles should be as effective as those assigned to an embassy in Washington, D.C. Thus, the Panel supports a broadening of authority and resources of the Uniformed Division of the Secret Service for the protection of all foreign missions in the United States. If this course of action is not possible, then the Department of State should recruit and train its own personnel, as a separate office of the Diplomatic Security Service for the purpose of protecting all threatened foreign missions. If this course is followed in the near term, consideration should eventually be given to consolidating all uniformed protection personnel within the DSS.

The Uniformed Division of the Secret Service does not provide personal protective services to resident diplomats. Although the Department of State does have the authority to provide the personal protective services to threatened diplomats, it traditionally has used its own agents for limited personal protective services to a few accredited ambassadors and other diplomats. The Department sometimes contracts with local police or private firms for the provision of "extraordinary" protective services (those services not typically performed by law enforcement agencies) for the few highly threatened resident diplomats. The Panel believes that the goal of the USG should be to provide adequate general coverage of resident diplomats except in those few extreme occasions when a diplomat is truly threatened.

The Panel recognizes the difficulties inherent in hiring local contractors to perform protective duties in the United States, regardless of competency. Some private companies are unable to obtain weapon permits from certain states. There are many restrictions regarding interstate travel by persons carrying weapons who are not sworn law enforcement officers. Contract employees can make arrests only when acting as private citizens. There are complex legal issues involved. Some law enforcement agencies will not cooperate with or impart information to local contractors. Yet, many police agencies have their own limitations including jurisdictional restrictions and inadequate resources. There are questions regarding the meaning of "extraordinary". protection. The problem is still evolving and the Panel believes that protective requests may increase in the future. Thus, it is the Panel's desire to see the Department itself ultimately apply its own resources to the protection of threatened foreign Chiefs of Missions as the need arises. The Department of State should review its current and future expectations of protective requests for threatened foreign diplomats and justify resources as necessary.
The Panel recognizes that until the basic responsibility for protection of foreign missions and resident diplomats is clarified and streamlined, the Department must seek the assistance of local police agencies and contract guard companies. The Department of State now has authorization and funds under the Foreign Missions Act to reimburse local or state authorities nationwide for "extraordinary". protective services performed at the behest and under the supervision of the Department of State. The Department has not yet issued formal guidelines for reimbursement. This extraordinary protection" constitutes both personal and facility protection. In those instances in which state and local authorities cannot provide the protection required, this authorization permits the Department to employ the services of licensed and responsible private security firms to perform the duties. However, Congress limited the amount of the funds available to any one state to 20% of the allotted total. Yet, some states have no diplomatic representation while other states, such as New York and California, have an extraordinary number of foreign missions. Many local police agencies cannot or will not provide continuous, extraordinary protective services for a resident diplomat either because of resource drain or because this is not a function typically performed by municipal police.

The Department should seek an amendment to the existing legislation contained in the Foreign Missions Act. The modifications should permit full payment to those agencies requested by the Department to provide more extraordinary protective services to foreign missions or resident diplomats than is currently stipulated by the 20% limitation. Further, the Department should immediately issue uniform guidelines for reimbursement.

The Panel believes that if the Department continues to rely heavily upon local police agencies and private contractors for resources to provide "extraordinary". protective requests, it is important that the level of service provided by any agency or company adhere to acceptable standards of performance. The Department of State should insure that acceptable levels of competence, performance and training are provided to any organization acting on the Department's behalf.

The Protective Liaison Division currently within the Office of Security performs a vital function. It coordinates information received overseas and domestically with local, state, and federal agencies. It appears to the Panel that this office is critically understaffed. This office does much more than coordinate protective activities: at times it serves as the only link between other agencies on a broad array of issues. The office should be expanded to contain personnel from all divisions that need representation and it should have appropriate exchanges and liaison personnel with a number of departments and offices and local law enforcement agencies.

Federal Protective Service of Russia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Protective_Service_of_Russia
In the Russian Federation, the Federal Protective Service (FSO) (Russian: Федеральная служба охраны, ФСО) was formerly the Ninth Chief Directorate of the KGB. It is responsible for the protection of Russian state property and high-ranking government personnel, including the President of Russia by the special unit- the Kremlin Regiment.
FSO has roughly 20,000 - 30,000 uniformed personnel plus several thousand plainclothes personnel and controls the "black box" that can be used in the event of global nuclear war[1]. It also operates the secure high-level communications system and the secure subway system used by the government Moscow metro-2.

On May 27, 1996 the law "On State Protection" reorganized the GUO (Glavnoye Upravlenie Okhrani) into the FSO (Federal Protection Service).

The FSO is a powerful institution with a range of rights and powers, including the right to conduct searches and surveillance without warrants, make arrests, and give orders to other state agencies.

The agency is headed by General Evgeny Murov and supervised by personal Putin's bodyguard Viktor Zolotov[1]. The service is still subordinated to Vladimir Putin and allegedly used to "keep an eye" on the current Russian president Medvedev.


Who Protects medvedev and Putin

http://world-portal.ru/novosti/rossijjskie/print:page,1,593-who-protects-medvedev-and-putin.html

Ready to improvise

KP: I'd like to begin by asking you about official improvisation. Journalists often note impromptu behavior during the president's and prime minister's official visits. Not too long ago in Beijing, President Dmitriy Medvedev digressed from his formal visit schedule, started speaking freely with Chinese students and even kissed a girl.

Evgeniy Murov: The president has the right to choose his own style of communication...

Q: And in Yelabuga, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin headed to the factory dining hall out of the blue, took a tray, stood in line and then ate with the workers.

A: That's our leaders' style and they're known for it all over the world. Our job is not to bind them to concrete plans and guarantee their safety. And that's what we do. Of course, we have to be prepared for the unexpected.

Q: The 12th anniversary of the law "On the Protection of the State" passed recently.

A: Yes, the law was ratified in spring 1996.

Q: How have these 12 years guarding the Kremlin influenced the Federal Protective Service?

A: Quite substantially. Previously Russia didn't have an analogous law. The state protective organ was called the Chief Department of State Protection in 1991-1996. It operated on the basis of the State Regulation on the Chief Department of State Protection via a presidential decree. When the federal law was passed, we were given a serious legislative framework to help us do our job.

Q: What exactly did the legislative base give you?

A: A lot. We've established an entire federal department with an optimal structure. We have a well-trained and highly professional staff. We also have the material and technical base required to solve the most complex tasks. Another recent achievement is the effective relationship that has been created among Russia's power structures.

Q: Are you referring to the Presidential Secret Service (SBR), Federal Security Service (FSB) and Interior Ministry (MIA)?

A: Yes, among others. We work together to solve the most difficult, multi-faceted problems facing Russia's leaders.

Q: Several years ago at the Kremlin parade dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Presidential Regiment, we caught a glimpse of the military technology used by the Federal Protective Service for the first time. Which arms are you equipped with now?

A: Well, we're not poorly equipped by any means. Let's put it that way. We've ordered and had the latest special military technology and weapons developed for us. Today, we can say that the Federal Protective Service is highly equipped.


President's and PM's guards

Q: What changes were made to the way protection is organized after Medvedev became president and Putin prime minister?

A: The Federal Protective Service plans and takes all necessary steps to ensure the safety of our nation's leaders in accordance with established procedure. I think here details would be superfluous.

Q: Yes, but nonetheless... The press has reported that "Medvedev and Putin divided their guards."
A: That's of little relevance. Here's why... There were two departments in the early 1990s protecting the state — the Chief Department of State Protection and the Presidential Secret Service. But all duplicity was eliminated when the law "On the Protection of the State" was passed. The Federal Protective Service was organized as a unified state organ and executes a list of tasks as set forth by the law. Time has shown that the merging of these two institutions was justified. The principle of undivided authority is at work. Consequently, issues such as who guards the president and who guards the prime minister don't affect our organization's structure. In a word, nothing's been divided. Everything just happened naturally.

Q: I've been at various events where the president and prime minister have participated. I've noticed that Putin and Medvedev both use their former guards. And in the Kremlin's main building, the same Federal Protective Service officials are working who were there when Putin was president.

A: Well where should they be? Medvedev's current guards have worked with him since he was elected president and the current head of state issued a special decree.

Q: I also noticed that Medvedev and Putin call the officers by their first names: Oleg, Aleksey, Nikolay... That doesn't seem by the book.

A: This really doesn't have much to do with anything. But I think human relations help, not hinder, in such difficult matters as protecting the state.

Q: How do you refer to your officers?

A: Also by name.
Taking threats by the throat

Q: How many people are protected by the Federal Protective Service in Russia?

A: Thirty, including 7 presidential plenipotentiaries in the federal districts. Notice the figure hasn't changed in the past 8 years.

Q: Time and again, the press refers to the "exact" number of individuals who work for the Federal Protective Service as 30,000, 130,000 and sometimes 180,000... How many are there really?

A: Much fewer.

Q: Fewer than 30,000 or 130,000?

A: No comment. But in these situations a bit of history comes to mind. In the early 20th Century, martial law was declared in the regions where Tsar Nikolay II was passing en route to rest in Crimea. Army posts were set up along the railway for as far as the track could be seen. Can you imagine? Our people who protect Russia's leaders during visits are several hundred less than those who guarded Nikolay II.

Q: How do you keep up with president's and prime minister's tough schedules?

A: The schedule is strained. It's a known fact that the president and prime minister are in good physical condition. Our guys follow an analogous regime. We pay special attention to their physical fitness. The Federal Protective Service officers always need to be ready, even when they're under pressure.

Q: Are threats often made to the individuals you protect?

A: Unfortunately, yes. Threats are often made. And this isn't just characteristic of Russia. It's a widespread phenomenon worldwide.

Q: How does the Federal Protective Service react in such instances?

A: Any signal demands careful inspection. The most serious measures must be taken. This is also accomplished by specialists outside our organization, such as the FSB, Foreign Secret Service and other power structures and law enforcement organs. On this note, a share of threats are made by the mentally ill. But every incident is carefully investigated. The details and nuances of all threats are clarified.
Numerous foreign languages

Q: The president, prime minister and other individuals under protection visit many nations throughout the world. What foreign languages does the Federal Protective Service speak?

A: Our goal isn't only to protect Russia's leaders, but also to provide security for high-profile foreign guests. In addition to special training, many Federal Protective Service officers speak the most widespread foreign languages like English, German, French, Spanish and Chinese. This doesn't only mean our employees who work on our leaders' visits abroad, but also those who work on our confidential intergovernmental connections. Today, permanent channels function between world leaders.

Q: So-called "Red Phones?"

A: Yes, that's how journalists call them. The first such connection appeared in the 1960s during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It connected the Kremlin and Washington.

Q: And the devices looked something like old wooden teletypes and were put on display at a Kremlin exhibition dedicated to the 125th anniversary of protecting the state.

A: Yes.

Q: And how do they work now?

A: We utilize the most advanced equipment and computers instead of "wooden teletypes." Our employees who provide Russia's leaders with confidential international connections are very capable people technologically speaking. The Federal Protective Service also provides interrupted, high-quality confidential domestic connections for our leaders. We also have situational centers that receive information about what's happening throughout the world in real time.

Q: Are you referring to the Kremlin's situational center?

A: Such centers aren't only in the Kremlin, but also the regions. Like Saint Petersburg. It certainly came in handy during the 2006 G8 Summit.

Case File

Evgeniy Alekseevich Murov was born in 1945 in Zvenigorod in the Moscow region. He has both a higher technological and higher special education. In 1974-1992, he worked in state protective organs and spent 3.5 years in Southeastern Asia. In 1992-1997, Murov headed regional FSB subdivisions in Saint Petersburg. From 1997, he served as the head of management at the FSB in Saint Petersburg and the outlying region. Murov was the first deputy head at the Department of Economic Counterintelligence at the FSB headquarters. From May 18, 2000, he served as the director of the Federal Protective Service. He has the rank of general. He is married with an adult son.

Background

Russia's Federal Protective Service comprises which organs:

1. Presidential Secret Service (SBP).

2. Special Vehicle Garage (GON).

3. Special Connections Service.

4. Moscow Kremlin Commandant's Service.

5. Presidential Regiment.

6. Presidential Orchestra.
Читайте: Кто и как охраняет Медведева и Путина

PHOTO LINKS

Photos of Secret Service Headquarters in DC/Presidential Protection Building and Secret Service agents training and at work:
http://eyeball-series.org/sshq/sshq-eyeball.htm
Photos of Secret Service preparations for a speech by George W. Bush at Monticello:
http://eyeball-series.org/prez-monticello/prez-monticello.htm

Photos of John McCain protection in Richmond VA:
http://eyeball-series.org/mccain-richmond/mccain-richmond.htm
Photos of Obama Protection:
http://cryptome.info/obama-protect/obama-protect.htm
Blurry pics of operations center for NYC convention security:
http://eyeball-series.org/nypd-spy/nypd-spy.htm
David Cohen is the New York City Police Department Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence:
He spent 35 years with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) before joining the firm. During his career at the CIA, Cohen guided the agency's operations and analysis functions. He also served as the senior CIA official in the New York area.

From 1995 to 1997, Cohen directed the CIA's Directorate of Operations, where he oversaw the agency's worldwide operations, managed the CIA's global network of offices and personnel, and maintained agency relationships with foreign intelligence and security services. From 1991 to 1995, Cohen was deputy director of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, where he guided the agency's analysis program, which reviewed every political, economic, and military assessment prepared by the CIA for the President and his senior national security advisors. Cohen's career at the CIA was marked by his leadership in combating global terrorism, international organized crime, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

http://eyeball-series.org/cohen/cohen-eyeball.htm
Various Shots of George Bush Presidential protection:
http://eyeball-series.org/prezsec/prezsec-eyeball.htm
Shots of breech of Whitehouse Security by Snowplow:
http://eyeball-series.org/wh-breech.htm